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I am large, I contain multitudes: 
Epistemic pragmatism, testimonial injustice and positive 
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Abstract: We explore the compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between two highly successful 
approaches to knowledge: Brandom’s epistemic 
pragmatism, [EP], and the view that derives from 
Fricker’s seminal work on the ethics of knowing, 
[EK]. [EP] and [EK] are complementary approa-
ches that put forward aspects of the application 
of the concept that deserve to be preserved. 
Nevertheless, their mere cumulative superposi-
tion produces dysfunctions that call for certain 
readjustments. We propose a positive kind of 
intersectionalism, [PI], that accounts for the fact 
that individuals simultaneously belong to diverse 
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Resumen: En este trabajo exploramos las com-
patibilidades e incompatibilidades entre dos 
enfoques del conocimiento distintos y de gran 
éxito. El primero es el análisis del conocimiento 
que ofrece el pragmatismo epistémico de Bran-
dom [PE]. El segundo es el punto de vista que se 
deriva de la obra seminal de Fricker sobre la ética 
del conocimiento [EC]. [PE] y [EC] plantean con-
cepciones complementarias de la aplicación del 
concepto de conocimiento que merecen preser-
varse. Sin embargo, su mera superposición acu-
mulativa produce disfunciones que exigen ciertos 
reajustes. Proponemos un tipo de intersecciona-
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1. The argument
Let us begin with a broad characterisation of [EP]. Being a knower is a social status 
whose possession requires the acknowledgement of other people. Discursive creatures, i.e. 
sapients in Brandom’s terminology, are participants in socio-linguistic games in which rea-
sons are provided, evaluated, and consumed. Paying tribute to Sellars, Brandom identifies 
the game of ‘making assertions and giving and asking for reasons’ (Brandom, 2000, 26) 
as occupying the ground level. Paying tribute to Hegel, one of Sellar’s inspiring heroes 
(Brandom, 2019, 114), he assumes that normative statuses, socially instituted, take the form 
of ‘mutual or reciprocal recognition’ (Brandom, 2019, 12). This intuition shared by Hegel, 
Sellars, and Brandom is common to any pragmatist approach to language. Conceptual 
contents emerge—and communication occurs—in highly regulated linguistic actions where 
participants play specific roles for which they have the appropriate kind of licensing. We 
will take this point up in the next section.
This is the first claim of our overall argument. For our purposes, it can be reduced to 
the Hegelian-like slogan, [HS],
[HS] Knowledge requires acknowledgement.
The second claim is a development of the first: the role of knowledge, as a normative 
notion, is the expression of complex attitudes of the agent who attributes it and the subject 
to which it is attributed. Let us call this claim ‘epistemic expressivism’, [EE]. Brandom’s 
epistemic expressivism makes self-attributions of knowledge logically dependent on third-
person knowledge attributions. Agents learn the game of attributing knowledge to them-
selves, i.e. they recognise themselves as knowers, by learning the game of attributing 
knowledge to others. This is a possible wording of [EE]:
[EE] Mastering the practice of self-attributing the property of being a knowledge 
possessor presupposes mastering the practice of attributing it to others.
[HS] and [EE] make conceptual remarks. They expose necessary connections between 
the concepts involved and the practices of applying them. Epistemic pragmatism, [EP], is 
the view that results of the combination of [HS] and [EE].
groups with variable epistemic conditions, some 
advantageous, some disadvantageous. [EP], [EK] 
and [PI] make a rich and coherent picture of sub-
jects as full epistemic agents.
Key words: Brandom, Fricker, intersectionality, 
knowledge, licensing, McGowan
lismo positivo, [IP], que da cuenta del hecho de 
que los individuos pertenecen simultáneamente 
a diversos grupos con condiciones epistémicas 
variables, algunas ventajosas y otras desventajo-
sas. [EP], [EK] y [PI] conforman un cuadro rico 
y coherente sobre los sujetos como agentes epis-
témicos plenos.
Palabras clave: Brandom, conocimiento, Fricker, 
interseccionalidad, licencia, McGowan
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[EP] directly implies that people completely deprived of the status of knower and, as a 
consequence, deprived of the status of knowledge attributor, cannot develop the required 
skills to recognise themselves as knowledge possessors.
Let us now consider the basic tenets of [EK] as we will understand it in this paper. In 
Fricker’s analysis, epistemic injustice occurs when people are harmed in their condition of 
knowers because they belong to disadvantaged social groups. Other researchers (Medina, 
2013; Cassam, 2019) follow Fricker’s lead in stressing that members of oppressed groups are 
prone to develop epistemic vices caused by their disadvantaged social positions. Fortunately, 
oppressive situations not only produce pernicious effects in people who suffer them. Some 
epistemic virtues are also produced by systematic epistemic harm. And the other way around. 
Situations of dominance contribute to the development of epistemic vices and, sometimes, of 
epistemic virtues too. Thus, the ethics of knowing and virtue epistemology make room for 
hope, articulating the possibility of overcoming their underprivileged starting point.
There is a sharp contrast between [EP] and [EK] in terms of their relative rigidity. [EP] 
points to certain necessary connections between concepts and their application, whereas 
[EK] explains the essential plasticity of individuals, which allows them to modify, adjust, 
and counterbalance their epistemic positions. We contend that both sets of intuitions are 
grounded and that there should be room for both in a mature approach to knowledge.
The relevance of [EP] conceptual analyses for the [EK] narrative is straightforward. Among 
the consequences of [EP] for [EK] we count the following three. First, [EP] implies that testi-
monial injustice, as defined by (Fricker, 2007), essentially produces an epistemic kind of injus-
tice, harming the victims in their status as epistemic subjects (Almagro et al., forthcoming).
Second, related to hermeneutic injustice, disadvantaged subjects do not possess the status 
to enact the norms that would facilitate the circulation of those terms and narratives that 
they use to explain their conditions. This way, members of dominant groups will be unable 
to take over the conceptual resources to understand oppressive situations.
The third one is that [EP], because of its conceptual and hence necessary nature, pre-
cludes the possibility of victims of different kinds of epistemic injustice to escape their fate 
by their own means.
These two last consequences of [EP] are too strong, contested by the analyses of Fric-
ker, Medina, Cassam, and others, and refuted by empirical data. Our aim in this paper is to 
show how [EP] and [EK] should be enriched to accommodate the empirical data and build 
up a consistent proposal that gathers together conceptual analyses and political approaches. 
Some hypotheses whose addition we suggest have been amply discussed, as the contextual 
nature of knowledge, and we will not insist upon them. Others seem to have attracted less 
attention, at least in the version required in this paper. In any case, our proposal is largely 
programmatic and in need of completion. Nevertheless, we believe that making the structure 
of the general argument explicit is a substantial step forward towards a general approach to 
knowledge that benefits from [EP] and [EK].
2. Epistemic pragmatism
Attributions of knowledge are the expression of hybrid attitudes. The notions of 
knowledge and belief are conceptually distinct because knowledge, unlike belief, incorpo-
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rates the attributor’s perspective. Even if self-ascriptions of belief can sometimes be cha-
llenged from outside, considering e.g. the believer’s behaviour, in ascriptions of knowledge 
the external perspective is an essential ingredient (Brandom, 2009, 157; Frápolli, 2019).
In this picture, knowledge attributions always give complex information that concerns 
the attributee’s as much as the attributor’s mental states. When we attribute knowledge to a 
subject, S, concerning a particular issue, p, as represented in scheme (1),
(1) S knows that p,
we perform three intertwined actions: (i) we attribute to S a belief that p, (ii) we attribute 
to S the entitlement to her belief that p, and (iii) we express our justified endorsement of p. 
These conditions are the counterparts of the traditional analysis of knowledge as belief, (i), 
that is justified, (ii), and true, (iii).
Attributions of factive notions always involve the attributor’s attitudes together with the 
attributee’s states, they always expose the attributor’s states and reveal the attributor’s perspec-
tive. Because factives support the inference from their attribution to the independent assertion 
of their propositional contents, the attributor indirectly asserts the content she attributes to a 
third party. This is basically Brandom’s account of the meaning of the concept of knowledge 
(Brandom, 2009, 157–8). Some examples of inferences involving factives are the following:
(1) She knows that p, therefore p,
(2) Her claim that p is true, therefore p,
(3) She remembers that p, therefore p.
(1-3) are instances of (4),
(4) S ϕ s that p,  p.
Moore-like paradoxes pop up whenever the assumption of the premise in (1-3) combines 
with the rejection of the conclusion.
The pragmatic layout just depicted explains Gettier-like phenomena. In Gettier’s exam-
ple, Smith is unable to distinguish between his justified true belief that the candidate 
who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket and the counterfactual situation in which 
knowledge of this fact could be attributed to him (Gettier, 1963).
Normative pragmatism shows that, exclusively from the first-person perspective, the 
speaker cannot discriminate between her credentials to assert that p, to assert that p is true, 
to assert that she believes that p, and to assert that she knows that p. To attribute knowledge, 
some kind of social triangulation is required, since speakers on their own lack perspective—
which involves access to the right kind of information—to ground a principled distinction 
between their knowledge and their mere justified belief (Frápolli, 2019).
Thus explained, knowing is something that others attribute to you, and that you can 
claim for yourself as a result of being attributed. This claim has widest scope and amounts 
to saying that the individual practice of knowledge self-attributions is parasitic on the social 
practice of attributing knowledge to others, i.e. that the former cannot be made sense of 
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without the latter. Speakers learn the self-attribution game as a result of mastering the game 
of external knowledge attributions. This situation highlights the importance of the role of 
the others for the image that we have of ourselves as epistemic subjects.
Brandom follows Hegel’s core idea, [HS], i.e. that recognition (Anerkennung) is the 
notion that grounds social practices in which other people are treated as bearing normative 
statuses. In his book on Hegel’s Phenomenology, we read:
To be a self in the full normative sense is to have not only actual normative attitudes, but 
also actual normative statuses. It is not only to take one-self or others to have authority 
or be responsible, but actually to have authority or be responsible. To achieve such a 
status, a normative subject must participate in a general recognitive dyad: must actually 
be recognized by someone that subject actually recognizes. For only suitably socially 
complemented attitudes institute actual statuses. It follows that normative statuses, 
normative subjects of such statuses, and recognitive communities of normative subjects 
are all synthesized simultaneously by recognitive processes that have an appropriate 
structure: the structure of reciprocal recognition. (Brandom, 2019, 293–4)
Brandom’s normative pragmatism is an elaboration of this intuition, which will be deve-
loped from a different perspective in the next section.
We endorse the essentially social nature of knowledge. It might be argued that sometimes 
subjects are in the position to attribute to themselves the knowledge that others deny them. We 
agree. Consider the following example: Victoria, a successful psychologist, insists, against the 
opinion of her colleagues, that the patient is in high risk of engaging in self-harming behaviour. 
She knows, she says, because she has followed the patient’s health history in the past two years, 
and because she has been profusely exposed to similar cases. Does she know? The answer does 
not depend on the outcome, i. e. on whether the patient actually inflicts some harm to herself. 
It might happen that the patient engages in some kind of self-damaging behaviour without 
Victoria having prior knowledge of it, and the other way round, that the patient manages to 
continue with her life without any patent indication that she may cause herself any harm even 
though she was, at that point, a danger for herself. But still, this is a case in which we have 
reasons to attribute knowledge to Victoria, based on her expertise, socially acknowledged, 
although the attribution is subjected to the analysis of the arguments on one side and the other. 
Truth and justification do not suffice for the attribution of knowledge, which also needs the 
acknowledgement of the attributor who acts as referee of the different scores that this complex 
status involves (Brandom, 2000, 119). Subjective certainty is neither necessary (Wittgenstein, 
1969, §§340-1; Williams, 2001, 18) nor sufficient (Ramsey, 1929, 256). And, as Gettier’s cases 
show, objective truth also falls short of grounding knowledge.
The role of the third-person perspective is common ground in speech act theory. Explai-
ning some recent developments that support our argument is the aim of the next section.
3. Authority and licensing
The structure of situations that involve attribution of knowledge—or its refusal—para-
llels the structure of other types of speech acts to which several agents contribute with 
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utterances that count as assertions. We follow McGowan (2019) in calling this general kind 
of speech exchange a ‘conversation’. McGowan argued that there are significant analogies 
between ordinary conversations and the performance of standard exercitives, in Austin’s 
sense. The CEO of a company uttering in an official meeting ‘From now on, holidays are 
suspended’ is an example of standard exercitive. A mother informing their children that dogs 
are not allowed inside the house is another, less formal, example. In exercitives, speakers 
enact norms that determine what is permissible in certain situations.
For the exercitive to be successful, the speaker who utters the permissibility norm has to 
possess a certain status. The secretary uttering exactly the same words as the CEO in the first 
example does not enact the norm; the child that pompously tells her siblings that dogs are not 
allowed inside the house does not produce a permissibility fact either. Only agents with the 
appropriate authority can enact norms in suitable contexts. As McGowan explains, the speaker 
who utters an exercitive must possess, besides authority, the intention to enact the norm, and his 
intention has to be recognised by the participants in the conversation. The success of the exer-
citive thus depends on the recognition of the speaker’s intentions, in the usual Gricean sense.
Contributions to ordinary conversations also enact permissibility norms—McGowan 
calls them ‘conversational exercitives’—that produce a change in the conversational score-
keeping, in Lewis’s terminology (McGowan, 2019, 28ff), or in the shared common ground, 
in Stalnaker’s terminology (McGowan, 2019, 39ff.). This is the main thesis of McGowan 
(2019). Hate speech and offensive or discriminatory linguistic actions cause harm by enac-
ting permissibility facts that can potentially add oppression to members of already oppressed 
groups. The effect of changing the score—or the background—is a general feature of contri-
butions to conversational exercitives, not restricted to situations of hatred speech.
Consider the following example: Victoria and Joan are discussing the best way to get to 
the concert hall to attend the performance of their favourite rapper, for which they bought 
tickets many months in advance. In the conversation, Victoria says: ‘My boyfriend, Mark, 
has a car.’ After this contribution, Mark becomes a salient individual in the conversation. The 
pronoun in Joan’s reaction to Victoria’s utterance, ‘Tell him to get us there’, unequivocally 
refers to Mark as a result of the permissibility fact enacted by Victoria’s sentence. After 
Victoria’s intervention, speaking of ‘the car’ is also permitted, etc.
Neither intentions to enact a norm nor the recognition of intentions is a success condition 
for conversational exercitives. By contrast with what happens in the case of standard exer-
citives, speakers do not need to have the intention to enact any norm when they contribute 
to ordinary conversations.
A further difference between standard and conversational exercitives concerns the role 
of authority. As we have mentioned, standard exercitives rely on the authority of the speaker 
to produce their effects, but McGowan is reluctant to extend the role of authority to conver-
sational exercitives. She acknowledges that, in a sense or another, participants exert some 
authority over the conversation (McGowan, 2019, 66), although of a weaker kind that she 
calls ‘standing’ (McGowan, 2019, 67).
There is a complex network of social norms that regulate who can participate in a 
conversation, i.e. who has the appropriate standing. Not everybody is allowed to join an 
ongoing speech act. This is something that depends on a wide variety of subtle social facts: 
your position in the community, your relationship to the participants, specific aspects of the 
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conversation at issue, etc. Adapting McGowan’s example, imagine that I approach a group of 
women at the Beverly Yacht Club—a club of which I am not a member. I friendly greet the 
ladies in the group and begin to talk with the patent intention to engage in a conversational 
exchange. Spite my efforts, they ignore me, not looking at me or even making any sign that 
they have heard me. They are making it clear that I am not welcome. As McGowan says, ‘I 
lack the requisite (in this case, social) standing’ (loc. cit.).
Possessing the appropriate standing is something that others confer upon you. One might 
think that my lack of standing rests on an objective condition; after all, I am not a member 
of this elitist resort. Had I owned the exclusive membership, their reaction to my efforts 
would have been different. A superficial reflection will show that this is not the case. The 
same group of ladies could have denied acknowledgement to members of the club, e.g. to a 
member who supported the Green Party in the last local elections, and could have welcome 
non-members, e.g. the elegant wife and daughters of the new governor.
Thus, the condition of being a suitable participant in a social exchange, linguistic or 
non-linguistic, does not depend on the candidate’s efforts. It is a normative status graciously 
conceded and maintained by people who already possess the standing. It is again an issue 
of Anerkennung, in Hegel’s and Brandom’s sense. Cases of bullying among teenagers and 
mobbing in working places, presently amplified by social networks, profusely illustrate 
how groups can ostracise people, denying them the access to participate of their activities.
Licensing is the kind of act by means of which the status to take part in a conversation 
is conferred upon a candidate. In standard cases, licensing is brought about by an explicit 
permission issued by others. Sometimes, nevertheless, the licensing is produced implicitly. 
A member of the group ostensibly speaking to the candidate enacts a permissibility fact to 
the effect of licensing the standing, thus permitting the candidate and the rest of the group 
to act as if she were a full member. In extraordinary situations, agents can even license 
themselves to act as authorities in specific contexts. In an emergency situation inside an 
aircraft, for instance, a passenger might assume the responsibility for controlling the passage, 
commanding other passengers to perform particular tasks, such as taking care of agitated 
passengers, calming children down, helping less able people to reach the emergency exits, 
etc. To do this, the accidental hero needs to be neither a physician, nor a policewoman, nor an 
emergency worker. Virtually anyone with the appropriate character and the will to help can 
take command of the situation. A further kind of self-licensing is produced by pretending: 
an agent can act in a situation as if she had the appropriate standing until it is recognised by 
the others participants (McGowan, 2019, 67). But even in cases of self-licensing, the others 
have to accept your authority. In the aircraft examples, the courageous passenger who steps 
up will only have authority if the passage accepts their commands.
Attributing knowledge to someone is considering her a full epistemic actor. The person 
who attributes and the person who is attributed must be licensed to participate in the episte-
mic conversation. People belonging to discriminated communities often lack the resources 
to assume and to pretend an authority role, and the possibility of being accepted by others as 
the bearers of authority. The effect is the silencing of discriminated subjects, who are most 
of the times ignored as interlocutors by members of dominant groups.
Licensing and silencing (Langton, 1993; Hornsby and Langton, 1998; see also Dotson, 
2011) show that testimonial injustice applies to other types of speech act alongside with 
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giving testimony. The concept of discursive injustice coined by Kukla (2014, 441) points out 
that those who belong to disadvantaged groups not only suffer in their capacity as knowers 
but also in their capacity as discursive peers. In a similar vein, Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015) 
argue that the range of speech acts that a speaker can perform within a conversation, what 
they call her range of speech affordances, is ‘adjusted in virtue of membership in intersecting 
social categories, more or less salient’ (Ayala and Vasilyeva, 2015, 132). Thus, Fricker is 
right when she connects epistemic injustice with other kinds of injustice to which members 
of disadvantaged groups are subjected. Testimonial injustice is the topic of the next section.
4. Testimonial Injustice
[EP] establishes a strict connection between the attitudes of other people towards an 
individual and her possibilities to become a full-fledged participant in social activities of 
a certain kind. The result is the impossibility for the subject to overcome a disadvantaged 
situation by her own means since self-attribution of knowledge and self-licensing are para-
sitic activities dependent on the intervention of others.
Alternative approaches to the analysis of knowledge, which pay attention to individuals, 
their social environments, and the character traits that they develop or inhibit because of 
their social position and experiences, make more flexible prognoses about people’s options 
to mend unfavourable conditions. These analyses deserve to be taken into account, if only 
because of their extraordinary success. In this section and the next one, we will touch upon 
the main lines of the phenomenon of testimonial injustice.
Fricker defines testimonial injustice as the credibility deficit received by a speaker due 
to prejudices against her social identity. As she says: ‘(T)he central case of testimonial 
injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility deficit’ (Fricker, 2007, 28). To qualify as a kind of 
injustice, the epistemic type must be connected to other kinds of injustice—social, political, 
economic—inflicted to the victim as a member of her identity group. For this reason, the 
phenomenon of testimonial injustice requires persistent and systematic mistreat. The feature 
of persistence calls for the transversality of epistemic offence across different context and 
situations; the feature of systematicity calls for its structural character. An isolated episode 
of credibility deficit does not count as testimonial injustice.
The scope of the harm caused by epistemic injustice, Fricker acknowledges (Fricker, 2007, 
58), must be determined by empirical research. There is abundant literature that supports the 
predictions of [EK] at school (Ehrlinger and Dunning, 2003; Huguet and Regner, 2007; Reuben 
et al., 2012; Estes and Felker, 2012) and outside, in feminist and critical race studies.
The mere mismatch between the credibility received and the credibility a witness deser-
ves, even if systematic and persistent, is not enough for testimonial injustice to arise. As 
Fricker defines it, no epistemic injustice derives from a credibility excess. Other authors 
have challenged this claim. Medina, for instance, widens the scope of epistemic injustice 
and includes the harm socially caused by the perpetuation of oppressive situations (Medina, 
2013, 60–1). Excess of credibility can undermine the possibilities of the subject to become a 
sound epistemic agent by promoting the development of epistemic vices, as we will discuss 
in the next section. Luzzi (2016), in turn, argues that testimonial injustice may emerge even 
in cases of accurate credibility attributions.
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The epistemic harm inflicted to a subject can be direct or indirect. When discussing her-
meneutical injustice—a kind of epistemic injustice caused by the shortage of interpretive, i.e. 
conceptual, resources to make sense of certain situations that the agent undergoes—Fricker 
acknowledges a ‘secondary’ kind of epistemic injustice that concerns the practical consequen-
ces of the ‘primary’, direct, harm. She describes the case of Carmita Wood, a worker victim of 
harassment that had to leave her work and could not claim any kind of benefits for the lack of 
an acceptable way of justifying the reasons that led her to quit her job (Fricker, 2007, 149–50).
Hermeneutical and testimonial kinds of epistemic injustice erode the confidence of sub-
jects in their epistemic abilities. The lack of confidence caused in a subject by her systematic 
and persistent valuation as an epistemically defective subject is a particularly significant 
consequence of the epistemic injustice of the primary kind (Fricker, 2007, 174). When the 
subject is not equipped to understand and explain the injustices inflicted to her, she is depri-
ved of an essential instrument to conclude that she has reasons to feel what she feels and the 
right to seek reparation. When the subject is systematically negated the status of knowledge 
giver, she is seriously undermined in her possibilities to develop an appropriate degree of 
confidence in her epistemic competence (Fricker, 2007, 58, Roessler, 2015).
Cases of epistemic injustice produce the development of epistemic vices and block the 
development of epistemic virtues, both in victims and oppressors. [EK] thus offers an inter-
nalist approach that prescribes corresponding epistemic—and ethical—virtues to balance the 
effect of those epistemic vices responsible for and caused by epistemic injustices. Even if 
Fricker stresses that ‘the human condition is, necessarily, a socially situated condition’, and 
that her philosophical conception aims to analyse ‘what constitutes good epistemic conduct 
in the socially situated context’ (Fricker, 2007, 176), her approach relies on the development 
of the appropriate individual attitudes to overcome unjust individual situations.
5. Epistemic Friction
Being a victim of epistemic injustice is compatible with being epistemically benefited 
in some other features.
In the nuanced approached that Fricker (2007), Medina (2013), and Cassam (2019) offer 
in their discussion of the causes and consequences of the epistemic kinds of injustice, they 
acknowledge complex epistemic conditions to the members of different groups. Victims and 
oppressors develop epistemic vices and virtues, due to their position, that explain why victims 
may become epistemically apt to a certain extent and oppressors epistemically diminished.
People belonging to dominant groups are prone to be confident and assertive, but also 
arrogant, insouciant, and narrow-minded. People in disadvantaged groups, by contrast, 
sometimes develop beneficial character traits, such as humility, open-mindedness and 
intellectual curiosity (Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007, 20; Cassam, 2019, 150), together with 
epistemically disadvantageous features derived from their social position, such as lack of 
confidence. Medina illustrates the point by mentioning the typical frame of mind of enslaved 
people, according to Tocqueville’s analyses, and the patent effects in women’s self-confi-
dence as denounced by feminist literature. In both cases, situations of systematic epistemic 
humiliation may end up in a lack of epistemic cognitive control on the part of the abused 
subject, who may end up doubting that they possess any cognitive power or even a mind. 
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Medina calls this extreme case of epistemic self-negation ‘ego-skepticism’: ‘a skepticism 
about the self, about its capacities and even about its very existence’ (Medina, 2013, 42).
Nevertheless, to draw the right conclusions from the theoretical and experimental work 
on undervalued populations, it is advisable to avoid both ends of an epistemic attitudinal 
continuous: neither should we ‘romanticized the predicament of the oppressed’ nor assume 
that they possess ‘impeccable epistemic characters’ (Medina, 2013, 40). And the same goes 
for the oppressing subject. The epistemic virtues and vices frequently detected in members 
of socially significant groups are neither exclusive of these groups, nor possessed by all 
individuals in the group, nor automatically developed by the mere belonging to the group 
(Medina, 2013, 43). Other individual traits and experiences may reshape the epistemic 
condition of particular agents.
Medina, following Wittgenstein, includes in his analysis the notion of epistemic friction. 
The epistemic character that a subject eventually builds up is substantially affected by the 
resistance that the world and other agents present to their beliefs. Note that our use of the 
term ‘resistance’ differs from Medina’s use. In his case, ‘resistance’ sometimes presents a 
political overtone that refers to the rejection by members of oppressed groups to accept the 
narrative with which dominant groups characterises them. In our case, it is a purely episte-
mic term that stresses the limits externally imposed for the development of a specific image 
of the world, understood in a broad sense. Not even mathematicians, who allegedly enjoy 
a maximal degree of freedom, develop their theories in complete absence of theoretical 
constraints (Frápolli, 2015, 337). Some friction is needed in order to maintain the subject’s 
web of beliefs grounded into the world. The willing exposition to the criticism of our own 
opinions reinforces epistemic responsibility (Medina, 2013, 54). People not accustomed to 
taking alternative epistemic perspectives into account, e.g. because of their dominant posi-
tion guaranteeing their opinions to prevail, are less likely to develop the kind of humility and 
open-mindedness that would otherwise immunise them against what we might call ‘social 
blindness’. Dominant classes can afford some degree of social blindness since their survival, 
actual or metaphoric, does not depend on any kind of social negotiation.
Social blindness and a deficit of epistemic responsibility cause epistemic injustices accor-
ding to Medina although not according to Fricker. The discrepancy is more apparent than 
real and rests on Fricker’s insistence in restricting epistemic injustices to those practices that 
cause harm to the speaker, whereas Medina widens the scope to cover also the harm socially 
caused in the form of perpetuation of injustices (Medina, 2013, 60–1). For our purposes, the 
debate is inconsequential.
In Medina’s global account, disadvantaged groups present a symmetric situation related 
to epistemic responsibility: because their members’ survival often depends on an understan-
ding as accurate as possible of the oppressor’s viewpoint, it is in their own best interest to 
develop social lucidity (Medina, 2013, chapter 5).
The virtue of epistemic responsibility only needs a minimal amount of social and exter-
nal friction, but it needs some amount. This minimal amount allows members of dominant 
groups, affected by some kind of social blindness, to develop some degree of responsibility 
and thus to be able to possess some knowledge about the life of others. On the other hand, the 
epistemic lucidity that members of oppressed groups develop also informs them of the lack 
of epistemic acknowledgement that they can expect. This meta-knowledge of the dynamics 
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of social relations may counterbalance the effects of the different kinds of epistemic injus-
tice that afflict disadvantaged subjects. Thus, their situation is not as desperate as it might 
be had them been ignorant of the dissimilarities defining opposing social groups. Besides, 
self-awareness of one’s capacity as a full epistemic subject can come from within your own 
marginalised group of belonging. An example are safe spaces, conceived as controlled com-
munities, deliberately protected from oppressive epistemic practices, and aimed at reinforcing 
the epistemic agency of marginalised subjects. In safe spaces, women are treated as epistemic 
subjects by other women, racialised people by other racialised people. And, as we will see 
in the case of women reporting other people’s health conditions, even by members of domi-
nant groups, although restricted to specific topics that derive from the social stereotype of 
women as carers. The effect of the variety and heterogeneity of epistemic situations within 
marginalised (and dominant) groups also covers hermeneutical injustice. Mason (2011), for 
instance, argues that the marginalised group of belonging is sometimes able to provide the 
hermeneutical resources that dominant communities lack. That they are able to export them 
to non-marginalised communities is a different story, as we have suggested in §1.
6. Positive Intersectionalism
It is now time to take stock. We have surveyed and endorsed the main lines of two con-
trasting approaches to knowledge. [EP] sheds an externalist stance on the complex informa-
tion, partly descriptive and partly normative, that knowledge attributions convey. [EK], by 
contrast, insists on the effects that sustained epistemic mistreatment produces on individuals.
Unlike [EP], [EK] gathers together heterogeneous positions. Cassam, Fricker, Herbert, 
Medina, to name some of the authors mentioned in previous sections, do not completely 
share their overall backgrounds. What they have in common is their interest in epistemic 
kinds of injustice and their impact on subjects in terms of vices and virtues. Moreover, they 
promote individualist strategies to repair damages, strategies that, nevertheless, are com-
patible with denouncing structural injustices and supporting global policies to overcome 
social injustice.
Part of the theoretical and practical interests of [EK] consists in identifying ‘how vices 
of the mind are obstacles to knowledge or how, as José Medina, puts it, they “get in the 
way of knowledge (2013, 30)”’ (Cassam, 2019, 3). Moreover, [EK] presents a therapeutical 
derivation that [EP] completely lacks. Cassam (2019, chapter 8), for instance, discusses how 
self-improvement is possible. There, Cassam argues for what he calls a ‘qualified optimism’: 
‘My aim isn’t that lasting self-improvement is always possible but that it sometimes is. Some 
epistemic vices are resistant to self-improvement strategies but such strategies are sometimes 
available and effective’ (Cassam, 2019, 171). A similar insistence on the importance of pro-
moting epistemic virtues is detectable in Fricker (2007, 71) and Medina (2013, chapter 6).
Considered this way, the two positions operate at different levels and show different 
theoretical and practical concerns. In a relevant sense, their theoretical consequences are 
orthogonal and should be compatible. Nevertheless, we have been suggesting that this is 
not necessarily so. There are specific points at which the consequences of [EP] affect the 
picture developed by [EK]. On the one hand, [EP] offers a principled criterion to highlight 
the essentially epistemic character of testimonial injustice (Almagro et al., forthcoming), 
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against those who have doubted that the victims of epistemic injustice actually are wronged 
in their epistemic rights. On the other, the conceptual priority of third-person attributions 
over first-person attributions seems to preclude that the capacity to overcome unfavourable 
epistemic statuses lies within the power of individual agents.
To accommodate the analyses derived from [EK] in a general overview respectful to 
the externalist perspective developed by [EP] we suggest the addition of a pluralist and 
dynamic approach to the composition and evolution of social groups. In doing so, we 
draw on the foundational idea of intersectional feminism (Crenshaw, 1989) to understand 
the complex nature of social identities. Discrimination does not occur along a single 
categorical axis, but a variety of mutually interacting or intersecting axes often combines 
to shape the individual’s social identity. Besides, Crenshaw argues, subjects defined by 
several axes of oppression suffer from a form of discrimination that goes beyond the sum 
of the basic oppressions.
We extend Crenshaw’s insight to cover not only those axes on which discrimination 
occur, a kind of ‘negative intersectionalism’, but also the positive epistemic situations that 
even members of multiply marginalised communities encounter. We call our proposal ‘posi-
tive intersectionalism’, whose leading insight is the acknowledgement that our position as 
epistemic agents is most of the times a mixture of advantaged and disadvantaged conditions. 
The complexity of social identities potentially has, we contend, a saving role. Otherwise, as 
it follows from [EP], we could not grow up as epistemic agents. Besides, as it follows from 
[EK], all of us present epistemic vices and virtues, and also character traits and epistemic 
habits that lead to knowledge and get in the way of it.
Positive intersectionalism puts forward two general points. First, social groups present 
fuzzy boundaries. This first aspect may be difficult to spot due to the underdescribed and 
schematic nature of the examples sometimes used. The excessive focus on identity aspects, 
disregarding political ones, illustrates the point. A migrant is only a migrant in her host 
country, and there are poor and rich migrants, although rich migrants are sometimes referred 
to by a different term: ‘expat’. Moreover, social identities are frequently named by vague 
predicates: ‘being working-class’, ‘being educated’, ‘being rich’, etc.
The second aspect that we want to highlight is that the relation between individuals and 
social groups is not one-to-one. Each of us belongs to an array of different communities, 
with varied epistemic statuses. This aspect has also been suggested by (Medina, 2012, 
218–20). One can be a white middle-class educated woman or a wealthy homosexual black 
man. Positive intersectionalism intends to focus on positive conditions too. Within each 
group, individuals can occupy different power positions: not all members of disadvantaged 
groups are at the same risk of suffering from epistemic injustice. Wealthy people are always 
in better position than poor people, men better than women, white better than black, etc. 
Some black women also are physicians and mothers. With their patients and children, they 
are the authority figure and receive the right amount of credence to compensate the deficit 
they suffer when other roles are more salient.
To these two senses of [PI], one should add the context-dependence of knowledge attri-
butions. Attributions of knowledge depend on contextual factors such as the relative episte-
mic position of attributor and attributee, the participants in the situation in which knowledge 
is attributed, but also the topic of attribution.
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Manne offers some examples of the perspectival status of individuals as subjects of 
knowledge. Based on empirical research, Manne explains that a single subject can be res-
pected as an expert about some contents and dismissed as unqualified about some others. 
This is the case with women who report on health issues of people at their care—elderly 
people or children—, about which they are considered ‘supremely competent’ (Manne, 2020, 
89), while they are scorned when it comes to report on their own health. The studies that 
Manne discusses ‘suggest that when women try to testify to their pain, they are routinely 
dismissed by the medical establishment on both of these bases—impugned as incompetent 
and hysterical, on the one hand, or as dishonest malingerers, on the other’ (Manne, 2020, 
86). She also presents results that confirm the diverse composition of groups, which are 
often treated as homogeneous: ‘According to recent estimates, black women in the United 
States are some three to four times more likely to die as the result of pregnancy or childbirth 
than their white counterparts’ (Manne, 2020, 77). Black women are seen as less credible 
than white women, independently of their social position or economic status, as Serena 
Williams’s case shows (Rankine, 2014, chapter 2; Manne, 2020, 78). Being a woman is not 
an epistemically homogeneous category.
[PI], in the sense that we have suggested, explains why members of disadvantaged groups 
are not condemned as epistemic subjects. Oppressed groups can present a sufficient degree of 
variability as to permit their members not to receive unjust epistemic treatment throughout all 
their epistemic interventions. Epistemic statuses should not be thought of as absolute states, 
granted once and for all and identical across all contexts, but as unstable, context-dependent 
properties, subject to permanent negotiation. Because epistemic injustice requires systematicity 
and persistence, as we seen in section 4, but not universality, [EK] can accommodate [PI].
That sound epistemic subjects can belong to marginalised groups does not neutralise the 
lessons learnt from [EP]. The necessary priority of third-person attributions still implies that 
subjects systematically deprived of any epistemic acknowledgement, i.e. victims of extreme 
epistemic violence, cannot become full epistemic agents. Fortunately, as positive intersec-
tionalism suggests, absolute epistemic neglect is not frequent. The standard situation is the 
one in which most of us usually are, one in which we receive a variable degree of epistemic 
acknowledgement and epistemic contempt. Without this variability we would be condemned, 
as [EP] claims. Fortunately, as [EK] shows, some degree of variability that includes benefi-
cial as much as harmful effects is (almost) always present in every human group.
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